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CASE COMMENTS
A different result was reached in United States ex rel. Sheffield v.
W1alle-, 42 where defense counsel realized any remedial motions were
foredoomed to failure. Counsel learned that the judge would not toler-
ate a motion for continuance, and failure to make such motion was
held not to be a waiver of defendant's right to allege prejudicial pre-
trial publicity for the first time on appeal.
It is submitted that the voir dire examination of prospective jurors
is the only effective way of determining bias within the jury. In the
Van Duyne case, a more extensive oral examination was permitted
after one juror had been selected in order to discover any possible
prejudice within the panel. If this procedure were followed by all
courts faced with the problem of prejudicial pre-trial publicity, a
greater number of impartial juries would be secured at the original
trial. This would eliminate the problem of reversing lower court de-
cisions, due to a biased jury, and then obtaining an impartial jury for
the first time on remand to determine fairly the guilt or innocence of
the accused. This expanded voir dire would permit an impartial jury
to be drawn at the first instance.
BAXTFR L. DAVIS
EXCULPATORY CLAUSES IN TUG ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS
A general principle of maritime law is that a tug is not a common
carrier' and hence not subject to strict liability for injury to its tow.
2
challenges has also been held to be a waiver of his right to object to prejudicial pre-
trial publicity on appeal. The appellate court may deem this important, for jurors
who could have been challenged were accepted by the defendant. United States
v. Milanovich, 303 F.2d 626 (4 th Cir. 1962); United States v. Shaffer, 291 F.2d 689
(7 th Cir. 1961); United States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1956); and Finnegan
v. United States, 204 F.2d 1o5 (8th Cir. 1953).
42 126 F. Supp. 537 (W.D. La. 1954).
1Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932); Compania de Navega-
cion Interior, S.A. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 66 (1928); The Margaret,
94 U.S. 494 (1876); Walter G. Hougland, Inc. v. Muscovalley, 184 F.2d 530 (6th
Cir. 1950); Ten Eyck v. Director Gen. of R.Rs., 267 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 1920); The
Atlantic City, 241 Fed. 62 (4th Cir. 1917); The Edmund L. Levy, 128 Fed. 683 (2d
Cir. 1904); American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Roen S.S. Co., 216 F. Supp.
353 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Glen So. Shipping Corp. v. Norfolk Towing Corp., 135 F.
Supp. 146 (E.D. Va. 1955); The St. Francis, 72 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1947); Mengel
Co. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 34 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. La. 1940); The Primrose, 3 F.
Supp. 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); The Sea Lion, 12 F.2d 124 (N.D. Cal. 1926); The Pacific
Maru, 8 F.2d 166 (SD. Ga. 1925); The M. J. Cummings, 18 Fed. 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1883);
The James Jackson, 9 Fed. 614 (S.D. Ohio 1881); Ulrich v. The Sunbeam, 24 Fed.
Cas. 515 (No. 14,329) (D.N.J. 1878); The Princeton, 19 Fed. Cas. 1342 (No. 11,433a)
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A contract purporting to release a tug company from liability for its
negligent performance of an assistance contract is not, therefore, in-
valid as a matter of law.3
In the recent case of Transpacific Carriers Corp. v. The Tug Ellen
F. McAllister,4 which sustained the validity of an exculpatory pilotage
clause, the libelant's vessel was damaged due to the negligence of the
pilot, supplied by the tug company, in miscalculating the strength of
the current. The District Court5 granted the shipowner recovery in
rem and in personam against the tug company; but the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, dismissing the libel, and said: "Having accepted towing
services under an agreement providing for certain limitations of liabil-
ity, libelant is not entitled to have this court rewrite the contract and
impose liabilities not bargained for." 6
The pilotage clause in question 7 provides that the tug captain
who goes on board the towed vessel becomes the servant of the assisted
vessel in regard to the orders he gives and the handling of the vessel
and that the tug is not liable for damages resulting therefrom.
The court reasoned that the pilot's negligent act was within the
pilotage clause with respect to the handling of the vessel and stated
that such a pilotage clause is valid absent a showing that the con-
tracting parties possessed unequal bargaining power.
Tug assistance may involve a contract for towages or a contract
(S.D.N.Y. 1851); San Francisco Bridge Co. v. Charles Nelson Co., 1o Cal. App. 2d 685,
52 P.2d 978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
'The Margaret, 94 U.S. 494 (1876); Walter C. Hougland, Inc. v. Muscovalley,
184 F.2d 530 (6th Cir. 1950); Glen So. Shipping Corp. v. Norfolk Towing Corp.,
135 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Va. 1955); Mengel Co. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 34 F. Supp.
685 (E.D. La. 1940); The M. J. Cummings, i8 Fed. 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1883); San Fran-
cisco Bridge Co. v. Charles Nelson Co., 1o Cal. App. 2d 685, 52 P.2d 978 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1936).
'In the absence of strict liability or regulatory statutes, only by legal adjudication
can such a power be restricted.
'336 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964).
52o9 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
636 F.2d at 576.
7"When the captain of any tug furnished to or engaged in the service of assisting
a vessel which is making use of her own propelling power, goes on board such vessel,
or any other licensed pilot goes on board such vessel, it is understood and agreed
that such tugboat captain or licensed pilot becomes the servant of the owner of
the vessel assisted in respect to the giving of orders to any of the tugs furnished
to or engaged in the assisting service and in respect to the handling of such vessel,
and neither those furnishing the tugs and/or pilot nor the tugs, their owners,
agents, charterers, operators or managers shall be liable for any damage resulting
therefrom." 336 F.2d at 573.
8"Towage service is the employment of one vessel to expedite the voyage of
another." Sacramento Nay. Co. v. Salz, 275 U.S. 326, 328 (1927).
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for tug assistance in the docking and undocking of vessels. 9 Contracts
for carriage are not involved.' 0
Three types of exculpatory clauses have been used in tug assistance
contracts: (i) clauses which stipulate that the assisted vessel under-
takes the entire transaction at its own risk;" (2) clauses which stipu-
late that all of the tug's employees are servants of the assisted vessel;' 2
and (3) clauses which make only the pilot a servant of the assisted ves-
sel.'3 The first two types are efforts to contract against all liability.
"This involves merely the parking or dispatching of a vessel from its loading
and unloading pier resting place.
"This would involve transportation of goods or persons. Mississippi Valley
Barge Line Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 244 F.2d 263 (5 th Cir. 1957). Liability in
carriage contracts is determined by statutes. The Harter Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 192;
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 901, 902.
"E.g., "all towing is done at the sole risk of such vessel."
Cases involving this type of clause are: Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349
U.S. 85 (1955); Compania de Navegacion Interior, S.A. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
277 U.S. 66 (1928); British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co. v. Mylroie, 259 U. 1
(1922); The Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1870); Ten Eyck v. Director
Gen. of R.Rs., 267 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 192o); The Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. igog);
Mengel Co. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 34 F. Supp. 685 (E.D. La. 194o); The John
J. Feeney, 3 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); The Primrose, 3 F. Supp. 267 (E.D.N.Y.
1933); The Vim, 40 F.2d 638 (D.R.I. 193o); The Sea Lion, 12 F.2d 124 (N.D. Cal.
1926); The Pacific Maru, 8 F.2d 166 (S.D. Ga. 1925); The Jonty Jenks, 54 Fed loai
(N.D.N.Y. 1893); The American Eagle, 54 Fed. oio (N.D. Ohio 1893); The M. J.
Cummings, 18 Fed. 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1883); The James Jackson, 9 Fed. 614 (S.D. Ohio
1881); Deems v. Albany & Canal Line, 7 Fed. Cas. 348 (No. 3,736) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1878); San Francisco Bridge Co. v. Charles Nelson Co., so Cal App. 2d 685, 52 P.2d
978 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
1'E.g., "and that the Master and crew of such tug or tugs used in the said
services become the servants of and identified with such vessel or craft and their
owners, and that the Tug Company only undertakes to provide motive power."
Cases involving this type of clause are: Boston Metals Co. v. The Winding
Gulf, 349 U-S. 122 (1955); The St. Francis, 72 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1947); The Mercer,
14 F.2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 139 N.E. 280 (1923).
'2 E.g., "When a captain of any tug engaged in the services of towing a vessel
which is making use of her own propelling power goes on board said vessel, it is
understood and agreed that said tugboat captain becomes the servant of the owners
in respect to the giving of orders to any of the tugs engaged in the towage service
and in respect to the handling of such vessel, and neither the tugs nor their owners
or agents shall be liable for any damage resulting therefrom."
Cases involving this type of clause are: United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S.
129 (1955); Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932); Gray v. Johansson,
287 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1961); Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Tugboat Neptune Co.,
171 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1948); The Margaret A. Moran, 57 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1932);
Calzavaro v. Planet SS. Corp., 31 F.2d 885 (4 th Cir. 1929); Farrell Lines, Inc. v. The
S/S Birkenstein, 207 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. The Sea
Scout, 164 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Pennsylvania R.R. v. The S.S. Beatrice,
161 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); People v. The S.S. Jules Fribourg, 14o F. Supp.
333 (N.D. Cal. 1956); National Distillers Prods. Corp. v. Boston Tow Boat Co.,
134 F. Supp. 194 (D. Mass. 1955); The St. Francis, 72 F. Supp. 5o (D. Md. 1947); The
Niels R. Finsen, 52 F.2d 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
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The third only attempts to contract against liability for damages re-
sulting from the pilot's negligent performance of the service.
Tugs have traditionally tried to avoid liability for their negligent
performance of tug assistance contracts. The practice usually em-
ployed has been to contract specifically against their negligence by
stating in the assistance contract that the assisted vessel proceeded at
at her own risk, or by saying that the tug's employees became servants
of the assisted vessel. As early as the middle and late Nineteenth Cen-
tury, doubt was cast upon the validity of such contract clauses, 14 and
a series of conflicts between the federal circuits resulted.10 When ordi-
nary care was not exercised, these clauses were generally considered to
be ineffective to release the tug company from its, or its employees',
negligence.16 Such declarations of invalidity, however, were based
solely upon the construction of the contracts as not intending to re-
lieve the tugs from liability for their own negligence, but only from
liability for damages occurring when neither party was at fault.17 This
11 The Steamer Syracuse, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 167 (1870); The American Eagle,
54 Fed. ioio (N.D. Ohio 1893); The Jonty Jenks, 54 Fed. 1021 (N.D.N.Y. 1893);
The Rescue, 24 Fed. 19o (W.D. Pa. 1885); The M. J. Cummings, iS Fed. 178
(N.D.N.Y. 1883); The James Jackson, 9 Fed. 614 (S.D. Ohio 1881); Williams v. The
Vim, 29 Fed. Cas. 1413 (No. 17,744a) (S.D.N.Y. 1879); Deems v. Albany SL Canal
Line, 7 Fed. Cas. 384 (No. 3,736) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878); Ulrich v. The Sunbeam, 24
Fed. Cas. 515 (No. 14,329) (D.N.J. 1878); The Alfred & Edwin, 1 Fed. Cas. 399 (No.
19o) (E.D.N.Y. 1874); The Princeton, ig Fed Cas. 1342 (No. 11,433a) (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
"5Compare Calzavaro v. Planet S.S. Corp., 31 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1929), where
an exculpatory clause was held not to exempt tug owners from liability, with The
Oceanica, 170 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. igog), where an exculpatory clause was held to
exempt the tug owners.
"'British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co. v. Mylroie, 259 U.S. 1 (1922); The
Vim, 40 F.2d 638 (D.R.I. 193o); The American Eagle, 54 Fed. 1o1o (N.D. Ohio 1893);
The Jonty Jenks, 54 Fed. 1021 (NiD.N.Y. 1893); The Rescue, 24 Fed. 190 (W.D. Pa.
1885); The M. J. Cummings, 18 Fed. 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1883); The James Jackson, 9 Fed.
614 (S.D. Ohio 1881); Deems v. Albany & Canal Line, 7 Fed. Cas. 348 (No. 3,736)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878); Ulrich v. The Sunbeam, 24 Fed. Cas. 515 (No. 14,329) (D.N.J.
1878).
Contra, Ten Eyck v. Director Gen. of R.RIs. 267 Fed. 974 (2d Cir. 1920); The
Mercer, 14 F.2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 139 N.E. 280
(1923).
l Compania de Navegacion Interior, S.A. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 277 U.S.
66 (1928); British Columbia Mills Tug & Barge Co. v. Mylroie, 259 U.S. 1 (1922);
Calzavaro v. Planet S.S. Corp., 31 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1929); The Vim, 40 F.2d 638
(D.R.I. 193o); The Sea Lion, 12 F.2d 124 (N.D. Cal. 1926); The American Eagle,
54 Fed. ,oio (N.D. Ohio 1893); The Jonty Jenks, 54 Fed. 1021 (N.D.N.Y. 1893); The
Rescue, 24 Fed. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1885); The M. J. Cummings, i8 Fed. 178 (N.D.N.Y.
1883); The James Jackson, 9 Fed. 614 (S.D. Ohio 1881); Deems v. Albany & Canal
Line, 7. Fed. Cas. 348 (No. 3,736) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1878); Ulrich v. The Sunbeam,
24 Fed. Cas. 515 (No. 14,329) (D.N.J. 1878).
Recent cases which have used similar reasoning are: Boston Metals Co. v. The
Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122 ('955); Walter G. Hougland, Inc. v. Muscovalley, 18.1
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left unsettled the validity of contracts construed as intending to re-
lease the tug company from liability for negligence.' s
In 1932, in Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co.,19 the validity of
a contract of the third type, construed as intending to release the
tug company from liability for its own negligence, was considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States for the first time. A unan-
imous court held that a contract making the tugboat captain, when
acting as pilot, the servant of the assisted vessel was effective to insulate
the tug from liability for its captain's negligence. The court reasoned
that towage did not involve a bailment and that pilot-supplying and as-
sistance was less than towage, and thus less than a common carrier
relationship existed. The Court further reasoned that the piloted
vessel was under no compulsion to accept the terms of the pilotage
clause and that there was no evidence to show that the parties to the
contract were not on equal footing. Justice Butler further pointed
out that it is an established principle of law that when one places
his employees at the disposal and under the control of another, he
becomes the employee of the latter.20
Although Sun Oil involved only a pilotage clause and not an at-
tempt to avoid total liability, many cases construed it as upholding all
exculpatory clauses. Further conflict resulted.2 1
In 1955, in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp.,2 2 the Supreme Court
of the United States seemed to dispose of the conflict by declaring
that a tug may not "validly contract against all liability for its own
negligent towage.' '23 Thus, a distinction was drawn between pilotage
clauses and clauses attempting total release from liability.
F.2d r3o (6th Cir. 195o); American Bridge Div., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Roen S.S. Co.,
216 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Glen So. Shipping Corp. v. Norfolk Towing
Corp., i35 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Va. 1955); Compania de Navegacion Cristobal, S.A. v.
The Lisa R, 116 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1953). See 44 Ill. B.J. 229 (1955).
"SIt is clear that if a court merely decides that two contracting parties did not
intend to agree to a certain obligation, it does not invalidate such an obligation
if it were agreed to.
'287 U.S. 291 (1932).
This type of reasoning disregards the contracted for exculpatory clause and
merely states that as concerns the factual situation, an agency relation did exist.
mThe St. Francis, 72 F. Supp. 50 (D. Md. 1947); The Harris No. 2, 45 F. Supp.
282 (E.D.N.Y. 1942); Mengel Co. v. Inland Waterways Corp., 34 F. Supp. 685
(E.D. La. 1940); The Melvin & Mary, 23 F. Supp. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); The John
J. Feeney, 3 F. Supp. 270 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); The Primrose, 3 F. Supp. 267 (E.D.N.Y.
1933); see Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in the Bisso case, 349 U.S. at 98,
117. Contra, Petterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. The J. Raymond Russell, 87
F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
-349 U.S. 85 (1955).
2349 U.S. at 85. (Emphasis added.)
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Justice Black, in the majority opinion, gave three reasons why a
tug should not be allowed to contract against all liability for negli-
gence: (i) negligence should be discouraged by making the negligent
party responsible for damages; (2) people who are in need of services
should be protected from people who drive hard bargains; and (3)
visitors to American ports should not be subject to "monopolistic com-
pulsions." 24 Justice Black distinguished Bisso from Sun Oil by stat-
ing that in Sun Oil the court was faced with a contract that relieved
the tug only from negligence on the part of the pilot, who was to be
deemed the servant of the assisted vessel.
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,25 felt that Bisso was
further distinguishable from Sun Oil by the fact that in Sun Oil, the
tow was under its own motive power, while in Bisso, the tow had no
motive power, no steering, and the movements were completely under
the control of the tug. Thus, Justice Douglas felt that in Sun Oil the
pilot was in fact the servant of the tow, as supported by the contract,
and that the tug assistance contract effectively relieved the tug of lia-
bility.
The reasoning employed by the majority in Bisso is criticized for its
logic26 and in its failure to abide by the reasoning in Sun Oil, to which
there had been unanimous assent.
27
Bisso, however, does represent the present law and stands for
the proposition that a tug owner cannot contract against all liability
for the negligent performance of an assistance contract either by an
explicit clause to that effect or by the fiction that all employees become
servants of the assisted vessel.28 A clause making a pilot the servant of
'349 U.S. at 91.
2349 U.S. at 95-
'69 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1955); 30 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1955); 17 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
93 (1955); 42 Va. L. Rev. 77 (1956); see Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Bisso, 349
U.S. at 98. See also 5 De Paul L. Rev. 132 (1955); 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 338 (1955).
-ISupra note 19. Bisso was a 5 to 3 decision in which Justice Black delivered
the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Warren, Justices Clark and Minton con-
curred. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurring opinion. There was a vigorous
dissent by Justice Frankfurter, who was joined in dissent by Justices Reed and
Burton. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision. In Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v.
Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963), Justice Harlan, in a concurring
opinion to a per curiam decision, said: "While I would prefer to see Bisso re-
considered, believing, with deference, that it was wrongly decided, I nevertheless
join in the opinion of the court." 372 U.S. at 698.
It is interesting to note that Justices Frankfurter, Reed, and Burton, all of the
original dissenters to Bisso, are now retired from the Supreme Court of the
United States, and of the majority, only one, Justice Minton, is retired.
B349 U.S. at 93. The Bisso doctrine is subject to two exceptions. In Southwestern
Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959), it was held that
when a towboat owner's power is effectively controlled or reviewable by a "per-
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the assisted vessel, as in Sun Oil, is entirely valid and absolves the
tug owner from liability for the negligent acts of the pilot.29 The
precise extent to which a tug owner can contract against some of his
liability for negligence, beyond mere pilotage, remains undetermined.
30
The considerations which may determine the extent to which
exculpatory clauses may be validly used in the future are whether:
(i) the assisted vessel is under its own motive power, (2) the assistance
involves ultrahazardous conditions, (3) the pilot is in fact the servant
of the assisted vessel, (4) the ship owner must accept a contract with
an exculpatory clause, (5) the tug owner has a geographical tug mo-
noply, (6) the towing practices are reviewable by a regulatory com-
mission, and (7) the burden of showing the nature of the tug industry
in respect to compulsion and monopoly is on the tug owner.
(i) If the assisted vessel is under its own motive power, the courts
have assumed that this is evidence that control, or at least the power
to control, remains in the assisted vessel and that the pilot is in fact
the servant of the assisted vessel. Thus, in the presence of an applicable
exculpatory clause, the tug is relieved from liability for damage re-
sulting therefrom.3 ' If the vessel is not under its own motive power,
the courts have assumed that this is evidence that control is with the
tug and that a master-servant relationship between the assisted ves-
sel and the pilot does not exist.32
vasive regulatory scheme," in this case the I.C.C., exculpatory clauses were not
void as a matter of law, but subject to such administrative review for determina-
tion. It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and
Douglas dissented from the majority opinion, which was written by Justice Harlan.
The second exception to this doctrine is found in Chile S.S. Co. v. The Justice
McAllister, 168 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where it was decided that an exculpa-
tory clause was valid when the tower had undertaken to tow a scow in an ice-
clogged river. This case indicates that the tower and tow are placed on an equal
footing where the former undertakes extreme risk, and constituting sufficient
consideration for a complete exculpatory clause.
"Exculpatory pilotage clauses have been deemed invalid in respect to uncon-
templated third persons injured due to the pilot's negligence. Boston Metals Co.
v. the Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122 (1955); Pennsylvania R.R. v. The S.S. Beatrice,
161 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Exculpatory pilotage clauses have also been held invalid when the injury is
to the tug itself. United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S. 129 (1955). This case reasons that
injury to the tug was not contemplated in the agreement.
:OThe future in this area is unclear due to a lack of consideration of these
instances. It is conceivable that in towage and docking and undocking contracts
that the tug companies may be able to avoid substantially all liability for their
negligence by means of a valid pilotage clause placing all employees under the
direct supervision of the pilot.
uSupra note ig.
u-Supra note 22; American S.S. Co. v. The Great Lakes Towing Co., 333 F.d
426 (7 th Cir. 1964). Contra, The Mercer, 14 F.2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1926); Graves v.
Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 159 N.E. 28o (1923).
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(2) If the assistance contracted for involves ultrahazardous con-
ditions, the courts have tended to infer that the risk of peril to the
tug may be sufficient consideration for an exculpatory clause.
33
(3) If the pilot would, by ordinary agency principles, be the servant
of the assisted vessel, then an exculpatory clause so stating will be
upheld.
34
(4) If the ship owner is under compulsion to accept a contract with
exculpatory clauses, this lack of equal bargaining power places the
ship owner at an undue disadvantage and the courts view this as a
reason for a declaration of invalidity.35 Lack of compulsion has led to
the contrary result.
36
(5) If it appears that the tug owner possesses a monopoly, this
is evidence that there is not equal bargaining power.
3
7
(6) If the towing agreement is reviewable by a regulatory com-
mission, the court will not enforce an otherwise void clause, but leave
it to the regulatory body to control.
38
(7) Where there is not an affirmative showing that a monopoly
exists or that there is an absence of equal bargaining power, the
courts are not clear as to who has the burden of proof. It appears
that if the clause in question attempts to avoid total liability, the
burden of proof is on the tug owner to show an absence of these fac-
tors,39 while if the clause in question is a pilotage clause, the burden
is on the assisted vessel to show that the factors do exist.4 0
The principal case, Transpacific Carriers Corp. v. The Tug Ellen
'Chile S.S. Co. v. The Justice McAllister, 168 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); The
Alfred 9. Edwin, 1 Fed. Cas. 399 (No. 19o) (E.D.N.Y. 1874).
3'Supra note 19.
3Dixilyri Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963);
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); American S.S. Co. v. The Great
Lakes Towing Co., 333 F.2d 426 (7 th Cir. 1964); Pittsburgh Consol. Coal Co. v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 223 F.2d 26o (3 d Cir. 1955).
"Supra note 4.
'7 Supra note 22.
8Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 36o U.S. 41
(1959).
*Supra note 22.
4 0The only case to deal directly with this problem, National Distillers Prods.
Corp. v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 134 F. Supp. 194 (D. Mass. 1955), said that the burden
of establishing a contract provision is against public policy is on him who asserts
that it is against public policy. This case was decided after Bisso and the court
directly referred to it. It appears, however, that such a decision, as a matter of
logic, is contrary to the rule in Bisso since there the party making the assertion
was awarded a favorable judgment when his adversary failed to negate the asser-
tion and no affirmative evidence of any kind was introduced.
CASE COMMENTS
F. McAllister, 41 introduces two additional factors. The court men-
tioned that "elimination of the pilotage clause would call for an in-
crease on insurance rates .... -42 The possible effect of this seemingly
minor consideration could prove to be very important. If the pilotage
clause were eliminated and insurance rates were increased, the tug
companies, due to economic necessity, would have to increase their
service rates. Thus, the ultimate burden of a declaration of invalidity
would be felt by the assisted vessels, the exact parties the courts have
been struggling to protect from "monopolistic compulsions."
4 3
The second factor was introduced by the court's statement: "Had
the ship owner wished protection against the type of damage suf-
fered it might well have secured it at an appropriate rate." 44 Declara-
tions of the invalidity of exculpatory clauses have been predicated
upon the absence of equal bargaining power.45 To circumvent this
reason for invalidity, tug companies may offer an option with a rate
differential concerning release-from-negligence clauses, a higher rate
being charged for a contract without an exculpatory clause. Thus, the
ultimate loss would again fall upon ship owners as a class.
Declarations of the invalidity of exculpatory clauses are intended
to place the burden on the negligent party when the contracting parties
possess unequal bargaining powers. The courts seem to operate under
the assumptions that corporate monopolies necessarily result in un-
equal bargaining power and that tug owners are better able to assume
damage losses than ship owners, neither assumption seeming to lead
to its conclusion. 46 The courts, making the above assumptions, have
then concluded that a declaration of invalidity frees the assisted ves-
sel from hardship, when in fact it is, at best, in the same position it
was prior to such declarations.47 It further appears that the courts are
inconsistent in declaring that exculpatory clauses against all liability
1Supra note 4.
'336 F.2d at 373.
'3Supra note 24.
41336 F.ad at 375
I'Supra note 22.
"2A monopoly may exist, and the parties may still be on equal footing as con-
cerns equal bargaining power if options are given to the ship owners. It is not at
all clear that tug owners are in a superior financial position.
1
7Under these practices, if damage results due to the tug owner's negligence,
and the assisted vessel elects to accept a contract with an exculpatory clause, it
will suffer the loss. If the assisted vessel selects a contract without an exculpatory
clause, it does not have to bear the loss caused by the tug for the individual damage
claim, hut the higher rate serves to compensate the tug owner for the additional
burden undertaken. In either case, assisted vessels as a class assume the loss, re-
gardless of their individual desires or needs.
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in tug assistance contracts are invalid, while upholding exculpatory
clauses avoiding liability only for the negligent acts of pilots. In
both situations, where the negligence lies and who has the superior
bargaining power are the same. It is submitted that the courts have
drawn a factual distinction unsupported by logic.
Furthermore, increase in insurance rates due to declarations of
invalidity, and contract options with rate differentials concerning ex-
culpatory clauses, may not only place the parties in a position of equal
bargaining power, but place the ultimate economic loss on the same
parties that bore the loss prior to such declarations, with the additional
disadvantage to the ship owner that the assisted vessels pay for the tug's
insurance costs even though the assisted vessel may already be ade-
quately covered by insurance or self-insured. This payment would be
forced upon the assisted vessel regardless of its wishes or its needs.
It is submitted that the Bisso doctrine should be revisited, since such
a declaration of invalidity may lead to undesirable results. 48
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8The following information is based upon a letter and materials submitted
by Mr. Gerard M. McAllister, Executive Vice President of McAllister Brothers, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.
Tug service rates vary, depending upon the day of the week, the size of the
assisted vessel, and the duration of the assistance time, generally from ;i5o.oo to
$4oo.00 for a base period of one and one-half hours. In excess of the base period,
and subject to the same above contingencies, the excess hourly rate varies generally
from $5o.00 to $8o.oo. The assisted vessels sometimes range in value from $5,ooooo
to $io,0O0O,00.
Severe damage done to an assisted vessel and chargeable to the tug company
could easily bankrupt the tug company. Exculpatory clauses were created in order
to protect the tug companies from such economic disaster. The United States Gov-
ernment had full knowledge of the existence of such clauses and consented to their
use. It appears, therefore, that exculpatory clauses, rather than being products of
"monopolistic compulsions," are a means of protecting a necessary industry from
total destruction.
Assisted vessels, insured or self-insured, are better able to assume such loss
than are tug companies. If the tug companies are required to insure against this
loss due to declarations of invalidity, then the assisted vessels will have to pay a
higher rate for tug services in order to cushion the tug company for its insurance
expenses. In such a case, the assisted vessel will suffer the ultimate economic loss
and pay twice for the same insurance coverage.
Competition in the tug industry is intense and healthy, and monopolies only
exist in those ports which are so small that the amount of tug assistance needed can
only support one tug company, such as Portland, Me., Savannah, Ga., Jackson-
ville and Port Everglades, Fla.
The use of exculpatory clauses in the United States is less severe and less pro-
tective of the tug industry than that found in many foreign ports. Following are the
towing conditions found in a Canadian tug contract:
i. The Tug Company will not be responsible for any delay in supplying tug
service arising from any cause whatsoever or for any loss, damages or injuries which
